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INTRODUCTION
Although the attorney-client privilege has a long history in American and common law,
the issue of whether the privilege extends to government entities and the attorneys who represent
them remains controversial. In 2005, the Second Circuit concluded that the privilege applies to
attorney-client relationships in the public sector,1 a holding that directly conflicts with recent
decisions in the Seventh,2 Eighth,3 and D.C. Circuits.4 These decisions h ave created uncertainty
for practitioners who represent government clients and have prompted considerable concern
from professional organizations. In a recent ABA teleconference, moderator Ross H. Garber
called attorney-client privilege “one of, if not the most important issue for government
lawyers.”5
The traditional justification for the attorney-client privilege is instrumental: the
confidentiality guaranteed by the privilege is necessary to promote candor in discussions
between attorneys and their clients. Many commentators have accepted this rationale
unquestioningly. However, available empirical evidence casts some doubt upon the instrumental
rationale even in the context of private individual clients, and it is still more questionable
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whether the privilege is a prerequisite for disclosure in the unique context of government entity
clients.
In this Article, I aim to demonstrate that the traditional instrumental rationale cannot
justify an absolute privilege with respect to government entity clients. Although my analysis of
the privilege in the government context will draw from historical precedent and existing
scholarly literature, I also hope to provide further insight into the way the privilege functions in
practice by grounding the discussion in a series of twenty-five interviews with government
attorneys that I conducted between November 2005 and January 2006.6
The Article will proceed in three parts. Part I provides the history of the government
attorney-client privilege, exploring its treatment in the model evidentiary codes as well as the
increasing attention it has received in the courts.
Part II explores the theoretical justification for the privilege in more depth. Although
conventional wisdom holds that an absolute privilege is necessary to induce client candor, this
instrumental rationale is particularly dubious when the client is an entity rather than an
individual.
Part III turns to the privilege in the government entity context. Since individual
government officers exercise lesscontrol over the p rivilege than do private individual clients,
such officers have very different incentives for disclosure in communications with attorneys.
Moreover, the background regime of open government provisions and the high degree of public
scrutiny that most governments receive fosters a climate of openness that contrasts to the
baseline expectation of confidentiality prevalent in the private sector. Therefore, in many cases,
the privilege currently provides less assurance of secrecy in the public sector. However, when
interviewed, most government attorneys stated that their clients were not preoccupied with the
possibility that attorney-client communication might become public. Moreover, attorneys
expressed that any undetected marginal decrease in candor caused by the uncertainty of the
privilege did not prevent them from representing their clients effectively.
This evidence strongly suggests thatan absolute privilege is not a necessity for effective
communication between government officials and attorneys, thereby undermining the traditional
instrumental rationale as a justification for the privilege in the government context. While some
protection for sensitive communications still may be appropriate, it is also important to take into
account the government attorney’s unique responsibility to serve the public interest. I do not
attempt to formulate the proper scope of the government attorney-client privilege in this paper.
However, courts should weigh these important considerations of transparency and openness in
government in adapting the contours of the attorney-client privilege to the unique context of the
public sector.
I.

EVOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers and
those whom they represent. Many attorneys and commentators have accepted as a matter of
course that the attorney-client privilege extends to government entity clients.7 However, a closer
examination of the history of the privilege calls this assumption into question. This section traces
the development of the attorney-client privilege for government clients in the United States,
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ultimately revealing only equivocal support for a conclusion that the privilege functions similarly
for government entities.
A.
Early History
Only two courts confronted the government attorney-client privilege prior to the 1960s,
and both assumed with little analysis that it protected government entities.8 This lack of
jurisprudence on the privilege resulted at least in part from the provisions of the Federal
Housekeeping Act, which enabled government officials to prohibit government employees from
testifying in court.9 Following the Act’s amendment in 1958, however, government officers
increasingly relied on the attorney-client privilege to block the release of sensitive information.
In 1964, United States v. Anderson upheld the existence of the privilege by analogizing to
the corporate context,10 casting its decision in broad terms that encouraged courts in several
subsequent cases to assume that the privilege applied to communications between government
attorneys and employees.11 The lone objection arose in United States v. Board of Trade of
Chicago, in which the United States attempted to shield from discovery documents prepared for
the Commodities Exchange Authority by the Department of Agriculture’s Office of General
Counsel.12 The court dismissed previous decisions as “conclusory, unsupported, and
unexplained” and asserted that “novel privileges should be grounded upon more pertinent and
persuasive precedent than this.”13 The court then found that the attorney-client relationship in
this particular government context was “more akin to the functioning of a high-level corporate
officer seeking the views of other corporate division chiefs than to the traditional lawyer and
client relationship.”14 However, the Board of Trade decision failed to instigate more widespread
skepticism about the government attorney-client privilege.
The Freedom of Information Act,15 enacted in 1967, also critically influenced the
development of case law on the government attorney-client privilege. When a party tries to assert
the privilege during ordinary litigation, courts tend to be skeptical because such action “deprives
the court of relevant evidence and may obstruct a just determination.”16 In the context of FOIA
requests, however, the case is often at an earlier stage and it is less clear whether the documents
will be of critical importance.17 Consequently, courts decided in a large number of cases that the
attorney-client privilege was grounds for refusing a FOIA request without the close scrutiny that
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they might have applied if the issue of government attorney-client privilege arose in a different
setting.18
Thus, until the past decade or so, courts tended to accept the privilege without substantial
analysis, although some underlying skepticism lingered. As the court in Jupiter Painting
Contracting Co. v. United States noted, “Courts have generally accepted that the attorney-client
privilege applies in the government context, while expressing apprehension at its pernicious
potential in a government top-heavy with lawyers.”19 For the most part, however, courts
alleviated any residual anxiety by reference to the two evidentiary model codes.
B.
The Model Evidence Codes
The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence were developed in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Proposed Rule 503, which would have codified the attorney-client privilege, was drafted
in 1969.20 As discussed above, at the time there were only five state and federal opinions that,
with little analysis, recognized the government attorney-client privilege. Despite this
disagreement and the overall paucity of evidence, the drafters of Proposed Rule 503 defined the
“client” who can assert a privilege as “a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or
other organization or entity, either public or private.”21 Similarly, the Advisory Committee’s
Note to Proposed Rule 503 states flatly that “[t]he definition of ‘client’ includes governmental
bodies,” citing existing cases that themselves failed to examine whether the privilege should
apply to government attorneys.22
Thus, like the courts that had previously considered the issue, the drafters of Proposed
Rule 503 relied on conclusory reasoning in applying the privilege to government entities; there is
no record of debate over the significance of this decision.23 Nonetheless, courts soon began to
look to Proposed Rule 503 as authority on the scope of the attorney-client privilege, and the rule
continues to provide justification for the privilege in the government context today.24
Proposed Rule 503’s conclusory justification for applying the attorney-client privilege to
government entities is particularly surprising given that the drafters in the near-contemporaneous
revision of the Uniform Rules of Evidence reached a contradictory result. Uniform Rule 502,
which addresses the attorney-client privilege, states that public entities may not claim the
attorney-client privilege unless the “communication concerns a pending investigation, claim, or
18
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action and the court determines that disclosure will seriously impair the ability of the public
officer or agency to process the claim or conduct a pending investigation, litigation, or
proceeding in the public interest.”25 Although this formulation substantially limits the privilege
for government entities, the drafters of the Uniform Rules also spent only minimal time
discussing the rationale underlying their construction of the privilege. Couched in general terms,
this justification relied primarily on the importance of open government.26
After the two sets of evidentiary rules were finalized, most states adopted the Proposed
Federal Rules, including Proposed Rule 503 with its application of the attorney-client privilege
to government entities. However, four states – Arkansas, Maine, North Dakota, and Oklahoma –
did adopt the Uniform Rules of Evidence version, with its substantially restricted version of the
government attorney-client privilege.27 A few states also adopted the Uniform Rules but excised
the provision restricting the scope of the privilege, essentially making the privilege coextensive
with Proposed Federal Rule 503.28 At least on the faces of the relevant statutes, different states
vary considerably in the way they treat the government attorney-client privilege.
At the federal level, the Proposed Federal Rules relating to privileges, including Rule
503, engendered considerable controversy.29 Ultimately, Congress instead adopted a single rule,
Rule 501, which allows the courts to apply privileges using “principles of the common law.”30
However, the federal courts have accepted the Proposed Federal Rules as evidence of common
law practices surrounding the privilege even though the Proposed Federal Rules were never
enacted.31 Rule 501 also states that federal privilege law applies except where state law supplies
the rules of decision.32 However, the Court has sometimes taken note of state privilege laws in
determining whether to retain them in the federal system.33
C.
Recent Developments
The history outlined in the previous sections suggests that conflicting ideas about the
proper scope of the government attorney-client privilege have existed, albeit in obscurity, for
several decades. The Watergate scandal could have exposed this tension if communications
between President Nixon and his legal advisors had been put at issue. However, Nixon waived
both the executive and attorney-client privileges, leaving White House Counsel Fred Buzhardt
free to testify before the grand jury.34 Similarly, Peter Wallison, White House Counsel under
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President Reagan, produced his diary and assisted in other ways with the Iran-Contra
investigation.35 Once again, the conflict remained a potentiality.
All this changed when the Office of the Independent Counsel launched a broad
investigation into the Clinton administration. The investigation resulted in a multitude of grand
jury subpoenas, against which President Clinton’s legal defense unsuccessfully tried to claim the
attorney-client privilege in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum36 and In re Bruce R.
Lindsey.37
In Subpoena Duces Tecum, the Eighth Circuit decided the issue of “whether an entity of
the federal government may use the attorney-client privilege to avoid complying with a subpoena
by a federal grand jury.”38 As part of the Whitewater investigation, Independent Counsel
Kenneth Starr issued a grand jury subpoena requiring disclosure of “documents created during
meetings attended by any attorney from the Office of Counsel to then-President Clinton and
Hillary Rodham Clinton (regardless of whether any other person was present).”39 The White
House (as the Eighth Circuit defined the party in interest in the case) cited the attorney-client
privilege as justification for its refusal to produce the documents.40
The Eighth Circuit distinguished the case’s criminal context from the civil context in
which much of the case law on the government privilege had developed,41 also noting “the
general principle that the government’s need for confidentiality may be subordinated to the needs
of the government’s own criminal justice processes.”42 The court then emphasized the significant
public interest concerns at stake:
“We believe the strong public interest in honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by public
officials would be ill-served by recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in
criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of public officials. We also believe that to allow any part of
the federal government to use its in-house attorneys as a shield against the production of information
relevant to a federal criminal investigation would represent a gross misuse of public assets.”43

Although the court acknowledged that voiding the privilege in the criminal context might create
uncertainty that would make the privilege virtually useless, it dismissed this objection by
explaining, “confidentiality will suffer only in those situations that a grand jury might later see fit
to investigate.”44 Thus, the court held that the privilege did not apply to the instant situation.
The following year, in 1998, the D.C. Circuit confronted an identical legal issue in In re
Bruce Lindsey, this time because Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey declined to
answer questions before a federal grand jury investigatingthen -President Clinton’s relationship
with Monica Lewinsky.45 The D.C. Circuit also held that the privilege did not provide a shield in
35
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the federal grand jury context. Similar to the Eighth Circuit, the court based much of its
reasoning on “the public’s interest in uncovering illegality among its elected and appointed
officials . . . another protection of the public interest is through having transparent and
accountable government.”46
The D.C. Circuit also focused on 28 U.S.C. § 535(b), a federal statute requiring that
“[a]ny information . . . received in a department or executive branch of the Government relating
to violations of title 18 involving Government officers and employees shall be expeditiously
reported to the Attorney General.”47 Although it is unclear whether the Office of the President,
and thus the White House Counsel, technically falls within the ambit of section 535(b), the court
found that the statute “evinces a strong congressional policy that executive branch employees
must report information” relating to criminal wrongdoing.48 Thus, the D.C. Circuit found that
this affirmative responsibility coupled with the public interest in disclosure of information made
the privilege inapplicable in the federal grand jury context.
The Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit departed substantially from previous case law
and other authority in finding that the government’s attorney-client privilege receded in the
context of a federal grand jury investigation. Not surprisingly, these two cases attracted
considerable attention in the scholarly literature, and both have drawn a fair amount of criticism,
both for their departure from precedent and for their purported partisanship.49
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Nonetheless, the idea of an abrogated government attorney-client privilege in context of a
federal grand jury subpoena began to gain traction. In In re A Witness before the Special Grand
Jury, the Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Eighth and D.C. Circuits in finding that
the Chief Legal Counsel to the Secretary of State’s Office of Illinois could not invoke the
privilege against a federal grand jury subpoena.50 The Seventh Circuit also cited the importance
of considering the public interest, explaining, “interpersonal relationships between an attorney
for the state and a government official acting in an official capacity must be subordinated to the
public interest in good and open government . . . .”51 At least in criminal cases, courts appeared
to have reached a consensus that the government privilege should yield.
However, the illusion of agreement ended with the Second Circuit’s decision in In re
Grand Jury Investigation.52 Similar to the Seventh Circuit decision, In re Grand Jury
Investigation involved a grand jury subpoena issued to the former Chief Legal Counsel to the
Office of the Governor of Connecticut.53 Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Second Circuit found
that the privilege was absolute. The decision relied partly on a Connecticut statute providing that
“[i]n any civil or criminal case or proceeding . . . all confidential communications shall be
privileged and a government attorney shall not disclose any such communications unless an
authorized representative of the public agency consents to waive the privilege and allow such
disclosure.”54 However, the crux of the Second Circuit decision was a belief that government
officials must be able to rely on the privilege in seeking legal advice. The court found that “if
anything, the traditional rationale for the privilege applies with special force in the government
context,”55 also noting that “upholding the privilege furthers a culture in which consultation with
government lawyers is accepted a normal, desirable, and even indispensable part of conducting
public business.”56 Similar to the Seventh, Eight, and D.C. Circuits, the Second Circuit found
that public interest considerations compelled its decision on the government attorney-client
privilege. But in stark contrast to the other circuits, the Second Circuit found that the public
interest justification actually compelled it to uphold the privilege, rather than to abrogate it.
Thus, recent Second, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuit decisions on the privilege
demonstrate that the extent of the government attorney-client privilege is unsettled, and will
likely remain so until the issue is argued before the Supreme Court. The importance of this
privilege is underscored by Executive Order 13,233, issued by President George W. Bush in
2001.57 Under previous law, presidents could only assert the privilege for as long as they held
office.58 However, the order decrees that presidents can continue to assert the privilege even after
they leave office.59 Thus, the scope of the privilege has gained even greater significance, given
reasons for rejecting the attorney client privilege for federal government entities do not apply in the state
government context).
50
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51
Id. at 294.
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Id. at 528.
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58
See Ira Berlin, Executive Order Undermines Democracy, Organization of American Historians website, at
http://www.oah.org/pubs/nl/2002may/berlin.html.
59
See Executive Order 13,233 § 2(a) (“the former President or the incumbent President may assert any
constitutionally based privileges”; “The President's constitutionally based privileges subsume privileges for records
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that it can be wielded unilaterally not only by current presidents, but also by former presidents,
years or even decades after they leave office, to control what information the public may access.
In less than fifty years, the government attorney-client privilege has evolved from an
ignored and virtually unused provision to a hotly-debated issue of paramount importance to
government officers’ efforts to shield sensitive information from disclosure to the public. Courts
and commentators continue to disagree on the subject. Thus, since ready answers are
unavailable, the remainder of this Article will look to the underlying justification for the
privilege and determine whether it applies to the government context.
II.

THE PRIVILEGE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Evidentiary authorities generally agree that the most compelling rationale for the
attorney-client privilege is instrumental: the privilege facilitates “full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients,” thereby promoting “broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice.”60 However, some evidence has called this
justification into question by casting doubt on whether the attorney-client privilege is in fact
critical to candor.
In this section, I first outline the traditional argument for the privilege, then discuss
empirical research suggesting that this argument is at least somewhat less compelling than many
believe. Moreover, to the extent that the traditional instrumental rationale is accurate with respect
to individual clients, I will suggest that it is less valid for entity clients such as corporations.
A.
Theoretical Justification for the Attorney-Client Privilege
Most evidentiary rules focus on the courtroom behavior of witnesses, attorneys, judges,
and juries, and are designed to ensure that evidence introduced in court is reliable and relevant to
the matter at hand.61 In contrast, the rules of privilege are concerned with conduct that occurs in
society at large. As Representative Elizabeth Holtzman observed during the Congressional
hearings on the then-proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, “unlike most evidentiary rules,
privileges protect interpersonal relationships outside of the courtroom.”62
These broader social implications of the privilege may explain why privileges in general,
and the attorney-client privilege in particular, have prompted so much debate. Nineteenth century
English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham sharply criticized the attorney-client privilege,
noting sarcastically that, if the privilege were revoked, “a guilty person will not in general be
able to derive quite so much assistance from his law advisor, in the way of concerting a false
defence, as he may do at present.”63
Bentham’s cynical view was disputed by evidentiary theorist Dean Wigmore, who argued
in favor of privileges on the grounds that they facilitate the search for truth and hence ensure
that reflect: military, diplomatic, or national security secrets (the state secrets privilege); communications of the
President or his advisors (the presidential communications privilege); legal advice or legal work (the attorney-client
or attorney work product privileges); and the deliberative processes of the President or his advisors (the deliberative
process privilege).”).
60
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1980).
61
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Psychological Critique of the Assumptions Underlying the Law of Evidentiary
Privileges: Insights from the Literature on Self-Disclosure, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 707, 707 (2004) [hereinafter
Imwinkelried, A Psychological Critique].
62
H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, at 28 (1973).
63
7 Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 473-75, 477, 479
(1827).
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accurate judicial decision.64 Wigmore’s theory was that certain communications “originate in a
confidence that they will not be disclosed” – in other words, but for the speaker’s belief that a
given statement will remain secret, the statement would not be spoken in the first place.65 Thus,
Wigmore believed, the privilege would not result in a net loss to the information available to a
trier of fact, because it would shield only statements that would not have been made in its
absence.66 Relatedly, Wigmore argued that, if a privilege applied, it must be “absolute” in
character.67 Because secrecy was a necessary precondition to disclosure, if the speaker felt that
secrecy was assured only in some circumstances, the disclosure still would be chilled.
Wigmore’s treatise became the foremost authority on evidentiary rules, and his view
remains extremely influential today.68 His conclusion thatthe privilege is necessary to promote
candid disclosure from a client to her attorney is deeply ingrained in contemporary legal culture,
and the view is so dominant that most lawyers, let alone laypeople, never pause to question it.
A few scholars have advanced non-instrumental justifications for the attorney-client
privilege.69 Charles Fried has argued that the privilege is necessary to the fundamental value of
client autonomy, claiming that it is “immoral for society to constrain anyone from discovering
what the limits of [the law’s] power over him are.”70 David Louisell grounds his justification for
the privilege in a concern for privacy, asserting that the inviolability of certain relationships are
“more important to human liberty than accurate adjudication.”71 Expressing a similar concern for
human relationships, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg once asserted that
privileges such as the attorney-client privilege “relate to the fundamental rights of citizens.”72
Finally, Charles McCormick argues that “[o]ur adversary system of litigation casts the lawyer in
the role of fighter for the party whom he represents. A strong sentiment of loyalty attaches to the
relationship, and this sentiment would be outraged by an attempt to change our customs so as to
make the lawyer amenable to routine examination upon the client’s confidential disclosures
regarding personal business.”73 The primary response to these arguments is that attorney-client
relationships do not deserve greater protection than the many other relationships in which
disclosures frequently occur.74 Thus, although these more conceptual theories have received
some attention, Wigmore’s emphasis on promoting candor has retained primacy.
Despite the dominance of the instrumental rationale, our legal culture still reflects a latent
discomfort with the privilege. As the Court acknowledged in United States v. Nixon,
64
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“[privileges] are designed to protect weighty and legitimate competing interests . . . [and] are not
lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”75
This account of the privilege lies in tension with the instrumental rationale: if Wigmore is right
that the privilege only protects communications that would not have been made in its absence,
then its application would not really represent a derogation.
In light of this underlying discomfort, it is important to remember that some of the
assumptions underlying Wigmore’s theory about privilege have never been empirically verified.
Most importantly, it has never been established that the privilege is actually necessary to
facilitate client candor. The following section will explore this assumption in more detail in
relation to particular types of attorney-client relationships.
B.
Implementation in Practice
The strength of the instrumental rationale for the attorney-client privilege varies
depending on the identity of the client. This section will suggest that the theoretical argument
that the privilege facilitates candor is strongest when the client is an individual, and is less
compelling when the client is an entity such as a corporation. Available empirical evidence
relating to the instrumental rationale does not support any firm conclusions: only a few studies
have been conducted, and even the most well-designed research construct can only imperfectly
simulate the calculus that takes place when an actual client weighs whether to disclose
information to her attorney. However, for both individual and entity clients, available research
suggests that the relationship between confidentiality and candor is less definitive than popularly
assumed. Ultimately, both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest thats ome
skepticism with regard to the instrumental rationale is warranted, particularly in the context of
entity clients.
1.
Representation of Individuals
In 1962, Yale Law School published the results of a study in which 108 laypersons and
125 lawyers filled out questionnaires regarding the importance of confidentiality in the attorneyclient relationship.76 The results of the surveys suggested that absolute confidentiality was not
necessarily critical to candid communication because many subjects believed that an attorney
would have to divulge confidential information in some situations. Thirty percent of layperson
participants (32 of 108) erroneously believed that attorneys have a legal obligation to reveal
client confidences if asked to do so by a lawyer in court, and nearly 20% (21 of 108) stated that
they did not know for sure.77 In general, laypersons were somewhat more divided on the effect of
the privilege than were attorneys. While 72% of attorneys (90 of 125) believed that the privilege
helped induce disclosure, only about half of laypersons said they would be “less likely to make
free and complete disclosure” without the privilege.78 Interestingly,only 45% of laypersons (49
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of 108) affirmatively believed that attorneys should not reveal confidential information if asked
to do so in court.79
The significance of the Yale study should not be overstated: it was conducted by a legal
periodical over forty years ago, and it is difficult to evaluate some of the data because lawyers
and laypersons were asked different sets of questions. However, the study is suggestive. As Fred
Zacharias has explained, its findings implythat, “ while a preference for nondisclosure rules
exists, a substantial majority of laypersons would continue to use lawyers even if secrecy were
limited.”80
Zacharias attempted to replicate the Yale study in the late 1980s, finding that the
relationship between the guarantee of confidentiality and the client’s willingness to disclose was
less symmetrical and more complex than Wigmore assumed. 81 Although nearly 30% of subjects
who had previously consulted lawyers on various matters stated that they had shared information
that they would have been unwilling to disclose without a guarantee of confidentiality,82 as
Zacharias observes, that there are a number of possible explanations for this result.83 Rather than
relying on the promise of confidentiality per se, the clients may have viewed confidentiality as
important “because they view lawyers as honorable professionals who customarily promise
discretion . . . .”84 In other words, participants may have viewed the guarantee of confidentiality
as an indicator of a lawyer’s competence rather than as a promise of absolute secrecy.
Other parts of the survey lend weight to Zacharias’ inference. One suggestive portion
asked subjects whether lawyers should disclose privileged information in morally compelling
situations where the current privilege rules nonetheless clearly forbid disclosure.85 In nearly all
cases, a substantial majority of subjects concluded that a lawyer should disclose the privileged
information.86 Moreover, the fact that lawyers could disclose information in certain situations did
not appear to impact subjects’ willingness to consult with attorneys: in each of twelve
hypotheticals, less than 25% of subjects indicated that they would be less willing to consult a
lawyer if such disclosure was allowed.87 Thus, the Zacharias study raises the possibility that
absolute confidentiality may not be necessary for individual clients to be willing to communicate
candidly with their lawyers.
Commentators have raised other questions about the need for confidentiality. Some
suggest that laypersons generally “engage in a balancing process” in deciding whether to share
information, weighing the “rewards, benefits, or utility of disclosure.”88 Yet this does not
necessarily support the need for the privilege, because we cannot “assume[ ] that the layperson is
acting rationally at the time of the decision whether to disclose.”89 For example, the client may
79
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be overly influenced by his own emotional reactions, or may have a “diverse variety of
conflicting, contradictory goals” that militate in opposite directions with respect to disclosure. 90
Another commentator has argued that the privilege provides a critical incentive when the client is
a criminal defendant because the client is unfamiliar with the legal details and is more likely to
withhold facts important to constructing a legal defense unless confidentiality is assured;
however, where these considerations are absent, the privilege is far less compelling.91 Finally,
several researchers have reported significant variations in self-disclosure patterns among
individuals92 – thus, even if some people do require the privilege to reveal information, it may
not be a necessary precondition for the majority.93
The available data simply do not provide a clear answer to the question of whether the
attorney-client privilege is a requirement for candid communication between individual clients
and their lawyers. However, it does seem that necessity of confidentiality is an open question
even for individual clients. The next section will discuss the even stronger cause for skepticism
about the instrumental justification in the corporate context.
2.
Representation of Corporations
Courts have consistently held that the attorney-client privilege applies in situations where
the client is a corporate entity.94 The seminal case is Upjohn Co. v. United States, in which the
Supreme Court not only held the privilege extends to corporations, but also affirmed that it
covers communications between an attorney and any employee representing the corporation,
rather than merely those involving a “control group” consisting of upper management.95
Following Upjohn, the corporate attorney-client privilege is firmly entrenched in legal
doctrine. Nonetheless, applying the attorney-client privilege to the corporate context adds a new
layer of conceptual difficulty.96 People generally advance the same instrumental rationale as for
individual clients – “to encourage more open and candid communication from those who
personify the corporation in order that attorneys can render more informed advice to the
corporation.”97 Importantly, however, the privilege extends only to the corporate entity, not to its
individual employees;98 thus, the interests of the corporation and of the individual employee are
not always coextensive.
90
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As a result of this misalignment of interests, corporate employees may lack incentive to
disclose information regardless of whether the privilege applies to the corporation as a whole.
Corporate counsel is likely to share information reported by an individual employee with at least
the upper management of the corporation. Thus, an employee may hesitate to reveal information
that looks bad for herself or for the corporation, either because she fears reprisal from her
employer or because she fears more general damage to her reputation.99
This concern is particularly salient because the employee has no personal control over the
privilege: when the client is a corporate entity, only the board of directors has the power to waive
or assert the privilege.100 Should the board decide to waive the privilege on behalf of the
corporation, the individual employee has no means of resisting, even if the information revealed
is personally damaging.101 Even for relatively high-ranking employees who do exercise some
control over the privilege, the possibility that information will be shared with other high ranking
employees may create a disincentive to reveal information.102
The only existing empirical study of the corporate attorney-client privilege, conducted in
the 1980s, also suggested that the privilege is not determinative in high-ranking employees’
decisions to disclose.103 In interviews, corporate executives did cite the privilege as one factor in
their decision to confide information, but the most important factor was their trust in the
particular attorney.104 If the privilege were tailored to allow disclosure in some situations, the
survey suggested that there would be little chill on most communications, although at the margin
it might decrease candor among upper-level executives, particularly with respect to written
communications.105
Paul Rice speculates that economic incentives may nonetheless provide justification for
the attorney-client privilege. He explains, “B ecause of the privilege’s guaranteed protection to
the corporation, the corporation’s hierarchy will be more willing to exercise the economic power
over its employees and order them to communicate with counsel. The threat of sanction will
often influence employees to relate facts that are adverse to themselves.”106 Although this seems
reasonable in theory, it is more challenging to envision how it would play out in practice. To
wield the threat of sanction effectively, upper management would have to be aware that the
recalcitrant employee knew something important. Moreover, the sanction the corporation
threatened would have to be more severe than the consequences the employee feared from
disclosure. Surely these conditions would obtain in only a subset of cases.
Rice also makes the argument that employees may decide to be candid simply because
“the interests of both the individual employees and the corporate client often coincide” and thus
the corporation.” Rice, supra note 7, §4:21 at 97, citing United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1388-92 (4th Cir.
1996).
99
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the assertion of the privilege “usually enures [sic] to the benefit of its employees.”107 Certainly
this unity of interests can occur, although it is less certain whether it affects employees’
disclosure calculations, particularly at the early stages of an investigation when it is unclear
whether their interests will be aligned with those of the corporation.
Notwithstanding Rice’sarguments, it is generally unclear t o what extent the privilege
actually encourages rank-and-file employees to communicate more candidly with corporate
counsel. For upper-level management, Melanie Leslie theorizes that the attorney-client privilege
may provide some incentive to be more forthcoming.108 Such executives’ personal interests are
more likely to be aligned with those of the corporation, and they may also have more influence
over whether the corporation as a whole waives the privilege.109 However, Leslie also expresses
skepticism about the eventual outcome: even if the privilege “affects the candor of upper
management at the margins . . . it often does so in service of dubious ends,” 110 perhaps by
allowing executives to conceal their own wrongdoing from shareholders and the public.
In sum, the instrumental rationale is less compelling in the corporate context than in the
individual context. For rank-and-file employees, lack of control over the privilege and fear that
inculpatory information will be disclosed to their supervisors means that the privilege will likely
provide little additional incentive for frank communication. For upper level management, the
attorney-client privilege might facilitate candor in some situations, although it is uncertain that
this eventually leads to the administration of justice. Ultimately, the corporate entity raises
problems with the instrumental rationale that will resonate even more powerfully in the
government context.
THE PRIVILEGE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
This Part will discuss the viability of the attorney-client privilege for government entity
clients. To contextualize the theoretical conclusions that courts and commentators have
advanced, I will also present some of the findings of a series of interviews that I conducted with
attorneys who represent state and municipal governments.111
III.

107

Id.
Leslie, supra note 16, at 494.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
The interviews were conducted during the two-and-a-half months between November 15, 2005, and January 31,
2006. The bulk of my interviews were with attorneys who worked for state attorney generals’ offices: I conducted
twenty interviews with attorneys in twenty different states. I also conducted five interviews with attorneys who
represented municipalities. To locate government attorneys willing to be interviewed, I either called a general
telephone number or sent an email to a general email address for a government entity. The attorneys I contacted
were exceedingly generous with their time; several discussions exceeded an hour in length.
I acknowledge the limitations of my research. First, the interviews were not standardized: although I
attempted to cover the same set of issues in each interview, the order and phrasing of my questions varied somewhat
depending on my interviewee’s responses. Thus, the information I gleaned may be used for only the broadest of
quantitative comparisons; any more specific analysis is likely to be deceptive. My sample of attorneys was also nonrepresentative. Although I attempted a degree of randomization by contacting the general number or email address
for government counsel, the attorneys with whom I eventually spoke cannot be described as a random sample. They
may have agreed to speak with me due to their specific experience with the privilege, their seniority in the office,
their familiarity with ethics issues, or simply their lighter workload. Finally, there might of course be a discrepancy
between what attorneys say about the privilege to an interviewer and what they actually do on a daily basis.
Despite these obvious shortcomings, I felt that the interview methodology I employed was appropriate to a
nuanced and complex issue such as the attorney-client privilege. Objective questionnaires would have allowed
greater standardization and more potential for quantitative analysis, but also might have encouraged attorneys to
108

15

Realities of government practice render the instrumental rationale unpersuasive in the
public sector. Like corporate employees, most government employees do not exercise individual
control over the privilege. Moreover, government employees are subject to open government
provisions and extraneous media and political pressures that considerably diminish their
expectation of confidentiality. Despite this background, government attorneys report that their
clients communicate with sufficient candor to allow adequate representation. Thus, although
confidentiality may provide a meaningful incentive for communication in some cases, it does not
have to take the form of an absolute privilege that guarantees total secrecy.
Since instrumentalnecessi ty does not justify an absolute privilege, the unique
responsibilities of public sector practice can help to determine a more appropriate tailoring. The
government attorney has a duty to work for the public interest, and as many commentators have
recognized, the important democratic values of transparency and openness in government bear
substantially on this interest. I do not attempt the complex task of delineating the privilege in this
paper; many competing considerations must be balanced against one another. However, in light
of the government attorney’s unique responsibility to the public, courts should weigh the
importance of open government heavily as they determine to what extent the privilege applies.
A.
A Climate of Openness
The attorney-client privilege operates against a backdrop of other provisions designed to
promote openness in government. Every state has a Freedom of Information Act and other public
records acts, which are designed to allow public access to virtually all government documents
that do not fall within a recognized exception. Many jurisdictions also have some version of an
open meetings act, which allows public attendance at any meeting between government officers
unless a recognized exception applies. Paul Rice has observed that the extent of open
government laws in seven states abolishes the government attorney-client privilege altogether;112
other states provide only a limited exception for attorney-client communications concerning
pending claims or litigation. 113 Moreover, Rice notes, “there have so far been no reported
adverse consequences from this action.”114 Such open government provisions have become the
norm rather than the exception; as one state attorney I interviewed explained, “people in state
government are used to operating under public scrutiny and being very candid.”115
As discussed in Part I.B, a few states have also adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
with its provision that the attorney-client privilege does not apply unless the communication is in
preparation for litigation or some other proceeding.116 Attorneys I spoke to from these states
differed in their assessment of how this evidentiary provision played out in practice: one stated
that “for all practical purposes, we treat it as though there is no privilege,”117 while another
craft cautious, lawyerly responses. The interviews also frequently yielded interesting information that a
questionnaire would not have uncovered because I would not have asked about it.
To facilitate discussion I assured all attorneys that information they shared with me would be kept
confidential, and that they would not be identified by state, agency or name. The source for each quotation in the
paper has been anonymized, and all identifying information has been redacted. Several attorneys requested copies of
my Article for their records, which I provided upon completion.
112
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hesitated before commenting, “I think most people don’t actually know about the exception. It
hasn’t come up.”118 At least in those states where attorneys are aware of the limitations on the
privilege, however, it seems there is little expectation of confidentiality.
The uncertain issue of who controls the privilege also reduces the expectation of
confidentiality. Ordinarily only the client can waive the privilege,119 but in the government
context, the client might be viewed as the individual officer, the agency, the executive branch,
the government as a whole,or even the citizens of the state or municipality.120 In some cases, the
identity of the client may vary depending on the structure of the government entity and the nature
of the matter at hand.121 Many attorneys I interviewed agreed that the client’s identity is fluid;
one state attorney recalled “a time when I spent an hour and a half speaking with our antitrust
attorneys to figure out who the client was.”122
Although such difficult questions of client identity do arise, the default presumption is
that the agency is the client. As the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers states,
“For many purposes, the preferable approach . . . is to regard the respective agencies as the
clients and to regard the lawyers working for the agencies as subject to the direction of those
officers authorized to act in the matter involved in the representation.”123 In practice, most state
attorneys adopted this presumption, agreeing that the agency was the client for the majority of
the matters they handled, while municipal attorneys viewed the city council as their client.
The fact that the client is usually an entity creates some of the same difficulties as it does
in the corporate context: since the agency itself cannot control the privilege, it is unclear which
employees can act on its behalf to waive or assert the privilege. In practice, the agency head
seems to control the privilege in most states, although again this has not been tested extensively
in the courts. A few state attorneys also thought that the governor might have input into whether
to waive or maintain the privilege.124 Others guessed that the governor could waive the privilege
over the agency head’s objections, but added that this had never occurred.125 At least one state
has a “control group” test, in which only one of a select few high ranking agency officers can
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assert the privilege.126 In the municipal setting, the two attorneys I spoke withagreed that the
privilege could be waived by a vote of the majority of the city counsel.
The important point is that in most cases an individual government employee exercises
little or no control over the waiver of the privilege. If an agency employee discloses sensitive
information to a government attorney, the head of the agency can later waive the privilege over
the employee’s objection. Relatedly, the attorney has an ethicalresponsibility to tell the head of
the agency when an employee reveals information of potential legal concern.127 Thus, for most
employees, there is little certainty of confidentiality even to the extent that the privilege exists in
their particular jurisdiction.
The possibility of waiver might provide littledisincentive for communication if
employees felt reasonably sure that their superiors would not waive the privilege. However,
many attorneys attested to substantial media and political pressures that often prompted waiver
of the privilege even if a government entity was legally entitled to assert it. As one state attorney
explained:
“There’s nothing in the Open Records Act that was intended to obviate the attorney-client privilege. But
there are pressures from the media if they are running their stories and they want to know something right
away. The presumption is that something will be released unless is falls within a recognized exception. And
sometimes, even if something would be privileged, a client will release it because there is political pressure.
A lot of times the client doesn’t want to incur the wrath of the public. . . . quite frankly, after you get
hammered in the headlines for several days, the attorney-client privilege becomes secondary.”128

Other attorneys agreed that asserting the privilege required a certain expenditure of political
capital that sometimes was not worth the benefit it yielded. One explained, “We usually
approach it as practically as possible . . . we may advise people just to waive it. The state doesn’t
want to be in the position of hiding the ball.”129
The realities of government operation provide important context for an examination of
the government attorney-client privilege. In many localities, officials are already accustomed to
substantial public scrutiny of their actions as a result of various open government provisions.
Sometimes such provisions effectively moot the privilege altogether. Even in governments where
the privilege continues to have teeth, however, government officers are not guaranteed
126

Telephone Interview with SA #6 (Dec. 5, 2005). Interestingly, this test seems very similar to the one rejected by
the Court in the corporate context in Upjohn. See United States v. Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383, 390-92 (1980).
127
See Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(b) (explaining that when a lawyer knows that there has been a legal
violation by a member of an organization, “the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as
determined by applicable law.”); see also Leslie, supra note 16, at 506; Barsdate, supra note 49. Federal law also
requires executive branch employees to report criminal wrongdoing by other employees to the Attorney General.
See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b).
128
Telephone Interview with SA #6 (Dec. 5, 2005). The same attorney also mentioned that with the short deadline
set by the state’s Open Records Act, media pressure sometimes even made it difficult to review all requested
documents prior to release. See also Telephone Interview with SA #17 (Jan. 20, 2006) (“I dealt with [media
pressure] in a situation involving the regulation of charities, where the attorney general is the client because there is
no separate agency that regulates it. So we went ahead and opened up all the files on a matter, and decided not to
assert the privilege, although we could have.”); Telephone Interview with SA #11 (Dec. 13, 2005) (“In representing
one of our state agencies, you have to be cognizant of the fact that whatever we do, the agreement will eventually be
public. Whereas in the private sector you’re not going to have Joe Public knocking on the door.”).
129
Telephone Interview with SA #7 (Dec. 5, 2005). See also Telephone Interview with SA #3 (Nov. 29, 2001) (“We
might be encouraging our clients to waive the privilege as a matter of public policy. As a practical matter, political
pressure might make waiving the privilege the best thing to do.”).

18

confidentiality. Since a high-ranking official – in most cases, either the agency head or the
governor – controls the privilege, the individual employee has no direct control over its waiver.
At the local government level, since the city council as a whole decides to waive the privilege by
majority vote, an individual council member also lacks absolute control over the waiver of the
privilege. Particularly given that external pressure from the media or other groups may make
disclosure of privileged information politically prudent even where not legally compelled, most
officers are not in a position to rely on the privilege to shield their communications.
The highest-ranking officials, such as agency heads, exert more direct control over the
waiver of privilege. However, open government provisions still apply to at least some of their
communications; moreover, media scrutiny is likely to be much greater for high-ranking
officials, leading to situations where the most prudent course of action is to release the
communications. Even when an agency head wishes to assert the privilege, she may face
significant pressure from other high-ranking officers to waive the privilege. Moreover, because
the privilege extends to the office or agency rather than the individual, even if a high-ranking
official decides to assert the privilege, her successor may later decide to waive the privilege and
make the communication public.130 Other provisions, such as the deliberative process privilege,
may provide greater protection for the communications of high-ranking officials than for low-tomid-level government employees.131 Still, at least with respect to the attorney-client privilege,
even these high-ranking officers are not wholly immune to the climate of openness that
permeates government, and cannot presume with absolute certainty that their communications
with their attorneys will never become public.
B.
Instrumental Concerns
The climate of openness present in government provides a backdrop for questioning the
viability of the instrumental rationale in the government context. Many commentators have
simply assumed that a weak attorney-client privilege in the government context would lead to an
unacceptable chilling of communication between government officers and their attorneys.132
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Evidence given to support this generalization generally takes the form of stylized hypotheticals
or citations to other commentators.133
However, interviews with attorneys who represent government officers suggestthat this
is not necessarily the case. Although attorneys reported that government officers sometimes
expressed a general concern for confidentiality, the existence of an absolute privilege was not
determinative in the decision to disclose information. Many attorneys regarded the privilege as
qualified, nonexistent under applicable laws, or uncertain due to other considerations, yet the
officers they represented continued to communicate with apparent candor. More importantly,
attorneys uniformly reported that regardless of any undetected chilling effect, they were still able
to provide adequate representation for their clients. Ultimately, the lack of a serious impediment
to communication and the continued ability of government attorneys to represent their clients
indicate that the instrumental concerns provide insufficient justification for an absolute
government attorney-client privilege.
1.
Candor
As explained above, the attorney-client privilege provides a less-than-absolute guarantee
of secrecy for government employees. However, it is uncertain whether this diminished
confidentiality actually reduces government employees’ willingness to confide in counsel.
Conversations with government counsel suggest that government employees are aware of the
privilege, but it is not their central focus. The degree of concern for the privilege varies
considerably from one government entity to another and from one government employee to the
next.
In some cases, government officers were attentive to the privilege. One attorney, who
also noted that the media was particularly active in his state, said that “not a week goes by that
one of my clients doesn’t say, hey [name redacted], do we have that attorney-client privilege
confidentiality thing. So they are acutely aware of it, and they ask about it continually.”134
Another attorney acknowledged, “Sometimes when I’m talking to a client people will ask if this
is privileged. Not because they did something illegal or something, but just because they want to
understand the ground rules.”135
Other attorneys felt that concern about the privilege varied from one client to the next. An
attorney who represented an agency of several hundred people explained, “Some people, they
have a red file folder marked privilege, and anything from me automatically goes in there.
Others, it just gets buried, and they are not really aware of it.”136 Attorneys also commented that
an employee’s amount of public sector experience sometimes factored into their concern for the
privilege. One stated, “We don’t talk about it a lot . . . . It’s because we have a lot of repetitive
clients. So they already know how the privilege works. Sometimes we get someone who we
haven’t worked with before, and they will say to me, if I tell you something, is it privileged?”137
Another agreed, “Newer people to government tend to ask about it more.”138
Finally, a significant group of attorneys stated that their clients were not concerned with
the privilege. One explained, “My experience has been, at least with the agencies I’ve dealt with,
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they don’t give a lot of thought to the attorney-client privilege. Sometimes I do have an agency
head say, ‘I’m telling you this as an attorney,’ even if they may not know exactly what that
means.”139 A twenty-year veteran of a state attorney general’s office agreed: “In my experience,
there hasn’t been much said about it in normal day-to-day representation.”140 To some extent, the
lack of concern for the attorney-client privilege may have been due to other confidentiality
provisions that exist in some jurisdictions, such as the deliberative process privilege.141 However,
it seems likely that many government clients are simply not overly preoccupied about whether
the privilege is available to protect their disclosures.
Regardless whether their clients expressed concerns about confidentiality, most attorneys
felt that these concerns did not significantly constrain communications with their clients. An
attorney from a state with broad open government laws commented, “There’s really not much of
a chilling effect. People just kind of do their job and don’t think about things becoming public
record.”142 The observation suggests that in many cases the fact that government employees need
legal advice to “do their job” is sufficient incentive to communicate with lawyers, regardless of
the contours of the privilege.143 Another attorney, whose state supreme court had held that the
attorney-client privilege did not apply in litigation between agencies, nonetheless felt that the
decision had not made clients significantly less forthcoming: “In general I think it doesn’t make
a difference. It’s kind of like putting TV cameras around. For a while people modify their
behavior, but then they forget and go back to what they were doing before.”144 An attorney who
worked in a state where the governor had recently released an agency memo without seeking
permission from the agency nonetheless believed that the incident would not chill
communications: “This won’t really affect things. Maybe on the margin people will be a little
less willing to talk, but for the most part, no.”145 On the whole, attorneys stated that their clients
were sufficiently candid with them, and felt that concerns about the privilege did not conflict
with the desire to obtain accurate legal advice through frank disclosure.
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If anything, attorneys felt that their clients become concerned about the privilege after
disclosing something, rather then tempering their candor pre-disclosure. One state government
attorney commented:
“I have not ever had someone say to me, I didn’t come to you because I thought someone might get this
information later. So I haven’t found that our open government has created obstacles to agencies getting
legal advice. . . . I think most don’t think about it until after the fact, and they say, wow, I wish I hadn’t said
that.”146

Another attorney explained that “in many cases, people want the attorney-client privilege
because they just don’t want to deal with the consequences. That’s just practical.”147 The concern
that a previous statement will become public, however, does not provide as compelling a
justification for the privilege as the concern that the statement will not be made in the first place,
because no chilling of communication has taken place.
Some attorneys even remarked that they wished their clients were lessforthcoming with
information, particularly in the context of electronic communications. One state attorney
explained regretfully,
“Things are forwarded so easily. I’ve sent something on email responding to an email from an agency
employee, and they forward it to all the managers, and then those people forward it to someone. So I don’t
know how many people it went out to – it could be in the hands of a hundred people! People think, ‘it’s just
email.’”148

Another added, “Every once in a while I have to send out a reminder saying, ‘please remember
to mark this privileged if it’s from me.’ Another thing is with email, sometimes people will send
me a message and cc, like, seven or eight people.”149 In such cases, attorneys felt that their
clients were not thoughtful about confidentiality and wished that they would be more
circumspect about their disclosures.
It would be an exaggeration to say that attorneys unanimously agreed that their clients
were willing to be candid regardless of the privilege. One state attorney felt that
“there are some situations in which clients wouldn’t be as frank if the privilege wasn’t there. . . . One of the
problems we have is getting our clients to come to us before they take action, because so many times folks
think all lawyers do is say no. I think that they will be even more reluctant if it’s not confidential. And I
think we would be less effective at serving them.”150

However, the same attorney readily acknowledged that his clients “don’t have absolute
assurance, because you can’t tell what a court is going to do,” suggesting that to the extent
clients do need the privilege to feel comfortable disclosing information, the privilege still may
not need to be absolute.151 Another attorney explained that “for a number of matters that are
sensitive or deal with issues of great importance, people want to know that the communications
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are covered” by the privilege.152 Aside from these two remarks, however, attorneys did not
emphasize the necessity of the privilege.
Some attorneys also admitted difficulty in persuading their clients to disclose information
to them, but did not necessarily attribute this to uncertainty regarding the privilege. One attorney,
who had worked in a state attorney general’s office for more than twenty years, remarked that
“you find that employees aren’t forthcoming if they’re not doing the right thing, regardless of
whether there’s a privilege.”153 Another attorney, who also had worked in the public sector for
about twenty years, explained that resistance to disclosure “sometimes comes up with
disgruntled employees. Like maybe they’re unhappy with the direction something is going, or
with the agency head. So they’re less willing to talk to the attorney, because they think why
would I talk to you, you’re the enemy too.”154 Neither of these impediments to candor resulted
from concern about the privilege.
At a recent ABA teleconference on Ethics for Government Attorneys, panelist Patricia
Salkin argued strongly in favor of a government attorney-client privilege. However, she also
remarked:
“[I]t’s common for all different kinds of staff to come in and spill their guts about vouchers not filled out
correctly, about all kinds of potential ethics issues going on with other people in the office and they think
that they can go and tell the lawyer to clear their conscience and walk out and feel good about it….”155

Salkin’s comment exemplifiesan under lying contradiction in the reasoning of many
commentators: if the point of the privilege is to facilitate candor, yet government employees tend
to reveal information even without the privilege, then what purpose does the privilege serve? The
point of the privilege is not simply to conceal information for the convenience of the government
attorney and her client – if the privilege is to exist, there must be some other policy rationale for
its existence.
In sum, the interviews with government attorneys provide at most limited support for the
instrumental justification for the attorney-client privilege.156 It is true that some clients express
concern about the privilege. However, attorneys indicated that most of their clients seem to think
about it infrequently, if at all. Moreover, the interviews also suggested that for many clients, the
existence of the privilege is not determinative of their decision to disclose. Although the
knowledge that a communication is privileged may put clients’ minds at ease, they also seem not
to know exactly what the privilege means, or even to need to know exactly what it means, in
order to disclose information.
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Not surprisingly, attorneys tend to think about the privilege much more than their clients
do. As one attorney said, “I do think that agency folks don’t think in advance about the privilege.
I think attorneys think about it more.”157 However, attorneys’ concerns surrounding the privilege
seemed to consist mainly of fear that an employee would accidentally waive the privilege,
thereby revealing something that would be disadvantageous in litigation. They were less
concerned that the uncertain legal status of the privilege would prevent their clients from
communicating candidly. Indeed, most attorneys’ efforts with respect to the privilege focused on
making sure their clients did not inadvertently reveal privileged information.158
Perhaps the most accurate conclusion to draw is simply that the importance of the
privilege in facilitating disclosure varies from one employee, agency, or state to the next.
However, even this conclusion demonstrates that the instrumental rationale is less powerful than
many commentators have argued. If many clients disclose all relevant information without
regard to whether their conversations are privileged, then for these clients the privilege is
superfluous. It prompts no increase in candor, yet shields communications from exposure, thus
resulting in a net decrease in the amount of information available to the public relative to a world
without the privilege.159 The exact degree to which the attorney-client privilege does operate to
increase candor among government employees is impossible to ascertain empirically; however, it
does seem that the actual increase is less than the instrumental rationale predicts.
2.
Quality of Legal Representation
The apparent candor of government employees despite the uncertainty of the privilege
calls the instrumental necessity of the privilege into question. However, the ability of
government attorneys to provide effective representation in the face of such uncertainty is also an
important consideration. It would be undesirable for an insufficient privilege to interfere with
government attorneys’ ability to advise their clients or unduly disadvantage the government
relative to private parties.
In interviews, government attorneys generally affirmed that they were able to advise their
clients effectively despite the uncertainty of the privilege. Some reported that they occasionally
modified their behavior to avoid creating a situation where sensitive information would be
subject to disclosure; however, they did not report negative consequences from such
modification. A thirty-year veteran of the attorney general’s office in a state with expansive
public disclosure laws explained that because everything would become public following the
conclusion of litigation, “if we have something that’s particularly sensitive, we don’t put it in
writing. Like with witness preparation – we don’t say, ‘we don’t want you to say this’ in
157
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writing.”160 Another attorney explained that if she goes to a meeting where she has not met
everyone present, the first thing she does is find out who everyone is before she begins to talk,
and “if there are people there who are not within the privilege, then I don’t have a privileged
conversation. I may say, ‘I may need to have a talk with the director later, but here’s what I can
tell you today.’”161
Commentators have questioned whether this sort of behavior modification, designed to
work around a weak area in the government attorney-client privilege, might prevent attorneys
from advising their clients as effectively.162 One can certainly envision scenarios in which giving
oral rather than written advice, or delaying advice to a client, might interfere with effective
representation. However, government attorneys described such behavior modification matter-offactly rather than negatively, implying that these adaptations to their working environment did
not actually have a negative impact on their performance. It seemed thatthe un certainty of the
privilege sometimes made the attorney’s job more difficult, but that in general this did not result
in less effective representation for the government client.
Moreover, awareness that information could be revealed sometimes even produced
desirable behavior modification. An attorney from a state that essentially treated the privilege as
nonexistent except in litigation explained,
“Sometimes when private attorneys come in they’re startled that we don’t have the privilege. But if it gives
us an incentive to provide unfailingly good advice, then I think that’s okay . . . . It’s like a check that keeps
you doing good work, the knowledge that something could be discoverable.”163

Another attorney could not recall a time when the privilege had been asserted in his division
outside of litigation. Nevertheless, he said, “in thirty-five years, I never felt constricted in terms
of what we wrote. Now when I came here, they said to me, if you’re prepared to put it on paper,
you better be prepared to announce it from the street corner. But we give the best advice we can
here.”164 These attorneys’ comments suggest that, in some cases, the knowledge that
communications might become public helps to ensure that government attorneys provide highquality legal advice.
The other major concern relating to the quality of legal representation is that without a
robust government attorney-client privilege, the government will face a disadvantage in
proceedings against private parties. Government attorneys readily acknowledged that limitations
on the privilege presented additional difficulties, particularly in situations where there were
competing interests at stake. One municipal attorney characterized government representation as
“much more difficult than having private clients” and explained that sometimes city council
members would leak information to acquaintances.165 Several attorneys also remarked that
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certain information was more freely available to the other side due to state FOIA laws that
narrowed the attorney-client privilege. A state attorney explained, “If you think the other side
hasn’t produced everything, the tools to compel them are more limited for us.”166
Although attorneys were forthright about these exigencies, they also felt that some
additional difficulty was inherent in government practice. No attorney could recall a situation
when constraints on the privilege had resulted in significant disadvantage to the government.
Interestingly, some attorneys indicated that, although their litigation opponents in the private
sector had far more access to potentially relevant information, this apparent liability often failed
to materialize in practice because their opponents failed to avail themselves of the broad
disclosure provisions affecting government parties.167
Moreover, even if the government might be slightly disadvantaged relative to private
parties in some circumstances, many attorneys stressed that this was simply a cost of the
openness critical to quality public sector legal representation. Public scrutiny, they felt, was an
integral component of their role. A thirty-five year veteran of a state attorney general’s office
stated firmly, “When dealing with public agencies you want as much disclosure as possible.”168
Another expressed agreement with a state decision abrogating the privilege in a criminal matter,
explaining, “This is a public agency, and there were public funds involved. It’s really a question
of the public interest, and you don’t want the attorney-client privilege to get in the way of
that.”169 Even an attorney who analogized representation of a municipality to “litigating with one
hand tied behind your back” readily agreed that “one has to balance the fact that this is an
annoyance in doing our jobs with the needs of the public for information and this principle of
open government.”170 Thus, according to some government attorneys, a claim that abrogating the
privilege impairs the quality of legal representation overlooks the contravening benefit of
transparency in government.
On the whole, attorneys seemed more concerned that the privilege might be limited in the
litigation context than in an advisory situation. Even attorneys who were generally content with a
very minimal attorney-client privilege emphasized that they were more concerned about
confidentiality once they were actually in litigation, noting the importance of other protections
such as the work product privilege.171 Provided that there was adequate protection for
conversations undertaken in anticipation of litigation, however, attorneys were much less
concerned about the abrogation of the privilege. The priority that attorneys place on shielding
litigation preparation from scrutiny is unsurprising, given our adversarial legal system, and it
seems reasonable for the privilege to provide some degree of heightened protection for such
preparation.

Such clearly problematic scenarios might be somewhat more likely in the municipality context, where a single
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C.
The Unique Role of the Government Attorney
Discussions with government attorneys suggest that the traditional instrumental rationale
cannot justify an absolute attorney-client privilege in all circumstances. However, a wide variety
of authority conveys a public-spirited vision of the government attorney’s role that provides
guidance in determining how the privilege should be tailored. This brief subsection cannot fully
explore the nuances of the government attorney’s role, nor will it attempt to delineate the proper
scope of the privilege. However, I hope to highlight these issues as important areas for further
research.
Various legal authorities have hinted that the government attorney has a special set of
responsibilities. In Berger v. United States, the Supreme Court explained:
“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.”172

Many lower court decisions have echoed this sentiment, 173 as have a number of respected legal
commentators.174 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also supports the idea that
government attorneys have a unique responsibility to act for the public good. The Comment to
Rule 1.13 explains, “a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question
[government officials’] conduct more extensively” than would a lawyer for a private
organization.175 As a result, “a difference balance may be appropriate between maintaining
confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business is
involved.”176 In some situations, government attorneys even represent the general public in a
more literal sense: for example, in the system of referendums and initiatives employed by
twenty-four states, government attorneys have primary responsibility for defending enacted
measures against legal challenge.177
This public-spirited conception of the government attorney’s role is mirrored by the
attitudes of government attorneys themselves. In the interviews I conducted, attorneys almost
universally agreed that their role was different from that of private attorneys because a concern
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for the public interest informed all of their decisions.178 Their awareness of this public
responsibility sometimes caused them to alter their behavior in a variety of ways to further what
they viewed as the public good. One attorney explained,
“We will be far less aggressive in objecting at a hearing when a public employee is being questioned. The
idea is that this is a public employee and he should have to explain himself. Even if opposing counsel is
asking fifty questions, and some of it is moving a little bit into something that is probably privileged, we
will let it continue.”179

Similarly, some attorneys explained that in certain situations they voluntarily disclose
information that might be privileged. A state attorney recalled a situation involving the
regulation of charities, for which the attorney general’s office is solely responsible: “We went
ahead and opened up all the files on the matter, and decided not to assert the privilege, although
we could have. . . . But if it’s more appropriate and more fair to the people of the state, then in
our office, we can make that determination.”180 An attorney who had worked in government for
twenty-two years spoke for many of his colleagues when he commented, “Our mantra is that
what we do is for the benefit of the people . . . Unlike private attorneys, we don’t zealously
represent clients.”181
All this evidence suggests that government attorneys do not have the unilateral
responsibility to their clients that private attorneys do. Although government attorneys do
advocate forcefully for the positions of the government officers and agencies that they represent,
their responsibility to the general public is always in the background and at times affects the
manner in which they represent their clients.
Courts have suggested that these broad concerns of public interest and justice come to
bear in delineating the extent of a privilege. For example, in United States v. Arthur Young &
Company, the court declined to create a privilege for an accountant’s work product on the
grounds that an independent auditor such as a public accountant “assumes a publicresponsibility
transcending any employment relationship with the client.”182 The Court explained that the
publicaccountant “owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders as
178

See, e.g., Telephone Interview with SA #1 (Nov. 22, 2005) (“Our mantra is that what we do is for the benefit of
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hardball even when we want to.”); Telephone Interview with SA #4 (Nov. 30, 2005) (“You are providing a vigorous
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considered the impact on the taxpayers, or on the public fisc. The agency may say, we just want this issue to go
away, and I’ll say, this is going to make a bad precedent, or to be a bad thing for the other agencies, or something.”).
Nearly every government attorney discussed the idea of serving the public interest without prompting.
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well as to the investing public. This ‘public watchdog’ function demands that the accountant
maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the
public trust.”183 Obviously there are important differences between an accountant and an attorney
for the government; however, the Court’s emphasis on the accountant’spublic responsibilities
demonstrates that the public interest is an important concern in determining the extent of a
privilege.
Ultimately, this paper does not attempt to formulate the exact circumstances under which
the attorney-client privilege protects communications between government officers and their
attorneys. However, conversations with practicing government attorneys indicate that the
instrumental justification carries far less weight than it has traditionally been assigned.
Consequently, we must look elsewhere for guidance in sculpting the contours of the government
attorney-client privilege. An array of authority suggests that the paramount responsibility of the
government attorney to work for the public interest, and it is with the public-spirited values of
governmental transparency and openness in mind that courts should attempt to craft a suitable
tailoring of the privilege.
CONCLUSION
The most commonly cited rationale for the attorney-client privilege is instrumental: the
privilege is necessary to facilitate candid communication between clients and attorneys.
However, in the government entity context, this justification falls short. The protection afforded
by the privilege is already uncertain, due to various open government provisions and political
and media pressures, yet government employees continue to communicate with sufficient candor
to allow government attorneys to provide effective representation. At least on instrumental
grounds, an absolute privilege is not a necessity.
Thus, a more limited version of the attorney-client privilege is appropriate for the public
sector. Courts, commentators, ethical canons, and attorneys themselves have noted the unique
responsibility of the government attorney to serve not only the government entity she represents,
but also the public interest. Ultimately, defining the privilege with this obligation in mind will
best facilitate the important democratic values of transparency and openness in government.
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